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The authors of this article are Lucía Cuadro-Sáez and Sonsoles Gallego of the Associate Directorate General 
International Affairs.1
Financial liberalisation in China has advanced significantly in the past three years. It has 
done so both domestically, with market principles weighing more on the functioning of the 
banking system, and externally, with the adoption of a series of measures culminating in the 
inclusion of the renminbi in the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket, effective this 
October. This financial liberalisation process is a fundamental ingredient in the ongoing 
rebalancing of the Chinese growth model, but it also entails some short-term risks, as 
highlighted by the bouts of turbulence recorded last year and early in 2016. This article 
reviews recent headway in liberalisation and the economic policy implications in China.
Financial liberalisation in China has advanced significantly in the past three years. It has 
done so both domestically, with market principles weighing more on the functioning of the 
banking system, and externally, with the adoption of a series of measures culminating in 
the inclusion of the renminbi in the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket, effective 
this October. This decision may be interpreted, for practical purposes, as testimony to the 
renminbi’s new-found status as an international reserve currency. 
For China, the liberalisation of its financial system is particularly important for many 
reasons. First, because it is a key factor in the rebalancing of the economy towards a 
greater weight of private consumption in GDP, as it provides both for a reduction in 
precautionary saving and the channelling of financial resources towards productive 
investment (see Chart 1). The liberalisation of lending and deposit interest rates should be 
particularly conducive to a more efficient allocation of credit, which has grown substantially 
in recent years. Further, small firms may see their financing needs better met, with greater 
access to markets and financial institutions other than public-sector banks which, in 
China, have routed credit to state-owned enterprises in the main. To date, the financing of 
small firms has depended almost exclusively on own funds, which raises saving and 
encourages informal loans. Moreover, external liberalisation and the internationalisation of 
the renminbi open the way for Chinese issuers to issue debt in their own currency on 
international markets, providing protection against balance sheet effects that have had 
such negative consequences for many emerging market issuers.
Historically, however, financial liberalisation processes have rarely been free from bouts of 
acute volatility or crisis [Díaz Alejandro (1985)], which illustrates the difficulty of managing 
this type of reform. Developments on Chinese financial markets since late 2014 suggest 
that China is no exception to this rule. From November 2014 – further to the establishment 
of a channel connecting the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges – to March 2015 
the Chinese stock market increased by more than 110%, this rise being corrected virtually 
in its entirety over the course of the following year (see Chart 2). Along these same lines, 
the exchange rate of the renminbi, which had held practically stable against the dollar 
since late 2013, depreciated by more than 7% from August 2015 to early 2016 (see 
Chart 2), despite the loss of one-fifth of the international reserves built up over the past 15 
Introduction
1  The authors wish to thank Marina Conesa for her excellent technical support.
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years. The rapid spread of these movements to international financial markets has 
highlighted the fact that, despite the incomplete liberalisation of its capital account, the 
shocks originating in China may pass through to other economies by means other than the 
trade channel, by affecting the degree of international financial markets’ risk appetite or 
aversion.
A useful conceptual framework when evaluating the different economic policy options 
China has is the so-called “impossible trinity” or “trilemma” that other emerging economies 
have faced in their external liberalisation processes. Under this framework, as the openness 
of the capital account increases, it becomes more difficult to maintain simultaneous control 
of interest rates and the exchange rate, obliging the economic authorities to opt for two of 
three objectives (control of the exchange rate, monetary autonomy or free capital 
movements). In China’s case, unlike in other, smaller emerging economies, its systemic 
importance raises the implications for the global economy depending on how this trilemma 
is resolved.
SOURCES: CEIC database, National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) and People's Bank of China (PBoC).
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This article reviews the recent headway in China’s internal and external liberalisation, and 
the consequences of both processes for its current economic policy options. The 
conclusion reached is that the solution to the trilemma in China’s case is for now an open 
question, the specific resolution of which will be greatly influenced by developments in the 
international environment.
China’s internal financial liberalisation has made enormous advances since the change of 
government in 2013. The progress has been on three closely interlinked fronts: the 
liberalisation of interest rates, the development of new monetary policy instruments and, 
more mutedly, the reform of the banking system’s ownership structure. 
The most notable aspect of this process has been the liberalisation of the interest rates 
banks apply to their transactions with customers. Initially, the central bank (People’s Bank 
of China) set benchmark interest rates, both for loans and deposits, that banks had to 
adopt and that were one of the main instruments for managing monetary policy (see 
Chart 3). The interest rate on loans was the first to be liberalised, as the room for flexibility 
given to banks became progressively broader, until they were granted full freedom in July 
2013 to set the minimum interest rate at which they lend funds. This has made for lower 
financing costs for agents and has fomented greater competition among banks. 
The key to domestic liberalisation, however, lay in the liberalisation of the interest rates on 
deposits, the return on which had traditionally been very low (and even negative in real 
terms). Also, to secure individuals’ trust in the system, a deposit guarantee scheme was 
established in May 2015,2 replacing the previous system based on the Government’s 
implicit guarantee. The liberalisation procedure was very similar to that for lending rates: 
from 2012 the room for flexibility in the rates banks could apply was progressively widened 
until all restrictions were eliminated by October last year. 
The liberalisation of interest rates marks an essential change in the functioning of Chinese 
monetary policy, as lending and deposit benchmark rates have been a key instrument to 
The process of internal 
financial liberalisation 
2  It guarantees 0.5 million yuan per depositor (approximately €68,000) and covers 99% of deposit accounts in 
China.
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date. Indeed, although the guidelines laid down by the People’s Bank of China have 
ceased to be binding, banks continue to take them into account. This means it is necessary 
to advance on another of the financial reform fronts, that of defining a new monetary policy 
implementation framework enabling the central bank to influence bank financing conditions 
in the markets, so that monetary policy decisions may feed through to the interest rates 
banks offer to their customers. 
In this setting, the People’s Bank of China wishes to establish an interest rate corridor 
system, similar to those used in the euro area or in Japan (see Chart 3), which is still at the 
development stage. The corridor’s upper limit will be given by the central bank’s “standing 
lending facility” and “medium-term lending facility” (created in 2013 and 2014, respectively), 
while its lower level would be the rate of return on surplus reserves. Although the 
intermediate monetary policy target is not defined, there is a possibility that the seven-day 
repo rate, which is less volatile than the Shibor (Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate3), is 
being considered as the alternative rate [Dong and Le (2016)]. The corridor system steers 
market expectations better, stabilises banks’ demand for liquidity and reduces the 
frequency, scale and costs of the monetary authority’s open market operations [Niu et al. 
(2015)], which would help China control the interest rate rises observed on the interbank 
market in mid-2013 and early 2014.
The area of internal liberalisation in which there have been fewest advances is that relating 
to the reform of the banking system’s ownership structure, where there is a notably high 
public-sector presence. The major public-sector banks account for approximately 50% of 
banking assets and the evidence suggests that the public sector exerts some control in 
most banks, although it does so in many different ways. The highly preliminary progress 
here has been in pilot programmes, such as that launched in late 2014 to create five purely 
privately owned banks. The presence of foreign capital is very low and no significant 
changes are expected in the short run since, although foreign bank assets have not ceased 
to grow, they have done so more slowly than local bank assets, meaning their share in the 
banking system’s total assets is declining. 
The way in which the liberalisation process advanced up to 2013 was a cause, but also a 
consequence, of certain significant adverse developments. In recent years, the increase 
in per capita income and the savings surplus generated against a background of 
extraordinary economic growth and strong financial repression were conducive to the 
formation of a real estate bubble, given the greater return on investment in this sector 
compared with traditional saving products. This environment also encouraged the 
development of high-risk segments within the shadow banking system, which grew at a 
much higher rate than did GDP (see Chart 2), leading to marked regulatory arbitration. 
The emergence of these sources of risk was a wake-up call on the urgent need to reform 
the regulatory and supervisory framework since, although China has virtually completed 
the adoption of the Basel  III regulatory framework [Bank for International Settlements 
(2015)], it still maintains significant segments that fall outside the scope of the various 
supervisors, which justifies the high priority given by the government to the regulatory 
and supervisory framework reform in the economic objectives for 2016. Additionally, 
international evidence suggests that financial liberalisation processes tend to cause 
significant credit expansion, which emphasises the importance of strengthening regulatory 
and supervisory frameworks.
China has completed its internal financial liberalisation with respect to interest rates, but 
much remains to be done in monetary policy implementation and, especially, in reducing 
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public-sector involvement in bank management – including the guidelines for granting 
loans – and in financial regulation, before all the system’s segments are covered.
External liberalisation has advanced unevenly. During an initial phase, which lasted until 
late 2014, progress was relatively modest. According to the schedule managed by the 
authorities, the opening of the capital account was expected to be completed once internal 
financial liberalisation was concluded towards 2020. Indeed, since the external liberalisation 
process started in the 1980s, it has advanced with notable caution through small-scale 
pilot programmes involving qualified institutional investors for investment both by 
foreigners in China and Chinese investors abroad.4 The programme quotas and the number 
of banks authorised to participate were gradually broadened, albeit in a limited manner. 
Also as part of the external liberalisation, from 2009 the exchange rate regime was 
gradually made more flexible and a policy promoting the international use of the renminbi 
was adopted.
The external liberalisation process gained strong momentum from late 2014, partly 
associated with the objective of converting the renminbi into a reserve currency. The 
Chinese authorities have pursued international recognition in the financial sphere more in 
keeping with China’s actual weight in the global economy and trade. In this context and 
with a view to eliminating restrictions on the international use of its currency, they have 
introduced greater openness in the capital account.
The channel connecting the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges, which broadened 
retail investors’ access to the international market, was established in November 2014. 
This channel allows for a broad group of investors resident in China to purchase equities 
in the Hong Kong market, subject to Shanghai regulations, and for foreign investors to do 
so in the Shanghai market through the Hong Kong market. These transactions are subject 
to much broader quotas than those relating to the prior pilot programmes for investment 
and take place inside a closed channel which avoids capital inflows towards other kinds of 
investment – such as real estate or speculative investments – or covert outflows. The 
marketing of financial products to retail investors by fund managers from China and Hong 
Kong was liberalised in 2015, albeit with certain limits.
Also, progress was made from late 2014 in the assignment of centres for direct convertibility,5 
which render permanent the currency swap agreements established by the People’s Bank 
of China with other central banks and facilitate the use of the currency abroad.
Since mid-2015, a substantial part of the liberalisation measures have been driven by the 
specific aim that the renminbi be included in the IMF’s SDR basket.6 In this connection, and 
in order to meet the “free use” and “free trade” criteria (see Box 1), central banks, sovereign 
The process of external 
financial liberalisation
3  Benchmark interest rate based on the interest rates at which banks offer funds in the Shanghai interbank market.
4  For example, foreign currency share transactions (QFII) and renminbi share and bond transactions (RQFII), in the 
first case, or the QDII and the Wenzhou pilot programme, in the second.
5  These are agreements which the Chinese monetary authority has been entering into since late 2008 in the wake 
of the global financial crisis. Direct convertibility makes it possible to reduce transaction costs. By mid-2014, 
25 countries had agreements for the establishment of direct convertibility centres with the People’s Bank of 
China for a total amount of 2.7 trillion yuan. These agreements are often linked to the existence of free trade 
agreements and also provide support to direct investment transactions, both to and from China.
6  According to the IMF Work Progresses on 2015 SDR Basket Review, in August 2015 the renminbi still did not 
meet the reserve currency requirements. Although widespread use of the Chinese currency in international 
transactions in Asia had been achieved, it was hardly used in North America and was not widely used in 
international debt security denominations.
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wealth funds and international financial institutions were granted permission to operate in 
the interbank foreign exchange market, subject to prior authorisation. The prior authorisation 
system became a registration system in 2016, thus easing the criteria for investor 
participation in the bond market. Participation in this market by qualified foreign institutional 
investors, such as commercial banks, insurance and securities companies, asset and fund 
managers and pension funds, was finally liberalised, without any quota limits.
Advances in the opening up of the capital account came hand in hand with a renewed 
boost to exchange rate flexibilisation (see Chart 4). In 2005, China decided to eliminate the 
fixed exchange rate system it had in place against the US dollar and established a de facto 
managed float regime against the dollar7 that has persisted through 2015. Under this 
system, the central bank sets the central parity on a daily basis (enabling the authorities to 
exert strong control over the exchange rate), with fluctuation bands that progressively 
expanded, reaching 2% in 2014.
In August 2015,8 the authorities changed the criteria whereby the central parity is set, moving 
it closer to its market value, which led to a more than 4.5% depreciation of the renminbi against 
the dollar during the first few days following the implementation of the new regime. In December 
2015, the authorities took a further step, relaxing the renminbi-dollar link and announcing that 
agents should establish the renminbi exchange rate based on a broader reference basket of 
currencies more representative of trade and investment flows. For this purpose, they created 
a new reference basket of 13 currencies, where the US dollar still has the most weight (26.4%), 
followed by the euro (21.4%). As a result of these changes, the renminbi depreciated against 
the dollar by 7.3% between August 2015 and January 2016. In more recent months, the 
correction against the dollar has slowed, in a context where the US currency has begun to 
experience downward pressures. Therefore, since the changes were introduced in December, 
the renminbi has depreciated less against the dollar than against its reference basket.9 
SOURCES: Datastream and CEIC database.
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7  Officially, the renminbi was linked to a basket of currencies whose composition was not disclosed. Evidence 
suggests that the dollar had a very high weight in it.
8  The exchange rate flexibilisation process was held back on two occasions: in 2008, as a result of the global 
financial crisis; and between June and August 2015, when a stable exchange rate against the dollar was deemed 
essential to prove its capability as a reserve currency. 
9  After two years of appreciation from 2014, the US dollar has depreciated in the last few months. This is associated 
with less robust growth in the United States, reflecting the expectation of a more gradual and more moderate rise 
in interest rates.
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These decisions have had a significant impact on global financial markets, contributing 
to bouts of turmoil and feeding strong pressures into the depreciation of the renminbi 
exchange rate, against the backdrop of the gradual slowdown in activity in China in line 
with the new economic model sought by the authorities. Accordingly, since the summer 
of 2015, the authorities have intervened repeatedly to curb exchange rate volatility, even 
acting in the Hong Kong offshore market (see Table 1) to halt depreciation.10 This has 
entailed a substantial cost in terms of international reserves, which have decreased by 
approximately 20% from a peak of $3.99 trillion in June 2014 to $3.2 trillion in April 2016 
(see Chart  4), although this decrease includes valuation effects associated with the 
dollar appreciation and payment commitments relating to development programmes 
funded by reserves. The expectations of a depreciation of the renminbi had a marked 
impact on short-term capital flows in China up to February 2016, with significant capital 
outflows (see Box 2) being recorded that have decreased in the last few months. In any 
event, the turmoil in financial markets in early 2016 has tempered the prospects of the 
opening up of the capital account, which is now expected to be more gradual, in order 
to preserve stability.
In summary, external financial liberalisation has received a strong boost in the past year, 
although there is still a long way to go. While it is difficult to quantify the degree of 
external liberalisation achieved, it should be noted that 35 of the 40 categories included 
in the IMF’s annual report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions are 
fully or partially liberalised.11
Until 2015, with interest rates kept very low in the United States and a relatively closed 
capital account, China was able simultaneously to maintain control over the exchange rate 
and its monetary policy. However, the current situation poses greater challenges for 
China’s economic policy. The normalisation of monetary policy in the United States as its 
macroeconomic recovery stabilises, with the ensuing risk of dollar appreciation, could 
drag the renminbi in the same direction, precisely when the Chinese economy is converging 
towards a path of lower growth. A more flexible exchange rate would weaken this bond, 
enabling the adoption of a monetary policy more attuned to its situation. Indeed, the 
events of 2015 illustrate how, with a porous capital account, maintaining a fixed exchange 
rate against the dollar has a high cost in terms of international reserves if it is not wished 
to increase interest rates and there are widespread expectations of depreciation.
Economic policy options 
for China and global 
implications
10  They have intervened both directly and through Chinese public institutions.
11  International Monetary Fund (2015).
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SOURCES: Funke et al. (2015) and Banco de España.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHINA'S ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE RENMINBI MARKET TABLE 1
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A useful conceptual framework when assessing China’s various economic policy options 
is the so-called “impossible trinity” or “trilemma” that other emerging economies have 
faced during their external liberalisation processes [Obstfeld et al. (2004)]. Under this 
framework, based on uncovered interest rate parity, as the openness of the capital account 
increases, countries find it more difficult to maintain simultaneous control over interest 
rates and the exchange rate. In the absence of free capital movements, authorities are able 
to conduct an autonomous monetary policy and to control the exchange rate because the 
international interest rate differential is not a determining factor for capital movements. 
However, when the financial account is liberalised, there is less room for manoeuvre. If the 
aim is a stable exchange rate, monetary policy cannot be independent, since the interest 
rate must be aligned with the international benchmark interest rate, normally the dollar; if 
the expectations of depreciation become widespread, reserves will decline. Alternatively, 
if the preferred economic policy is to pursue an independent monetary policy, the exchange 
rate will have to be the adjustment variable. In short, only two of the objectives can be 
achieved at the same time, never three.
China has been facing a situation similar to the trilemma since 2015 and, accordingly, 
there are several alternatives on the monetary and exchange rate policy front. If China 
were to opt to advance towards a free-float exchange rate in line with the IMF’s 
recommendations in recent years, by performing exchange rate interventions with the sole 
aim of mitigating excessive volatility as a first step towards the full liberalisation of the 
capital account,12 in exchange it would be able to pursue an independent monetary policy. 
However, in the current situation, this option entails the significant risk of intense capital 
outflows arising in the short term, similar to that which occurred in late 2015, fuelling 
exchange rate depreciation. A strong depreciation of the renminbi would pose problems 
on different fronts. Globally, given China’s high weight in world trade, it would increase the 
risk of deflation being exported to the rest of the world; additionally, other countries could 
interpret this as the beginning of a “currency war”. Domestically, financial stability problems 
could arise in certain sectors, as in recent years many Chinese companies have taken on 
debt in dollars, encouraged by the low interest rates and the expectations of exchange 
rate appreciation.13 In these circumstances, depreciation of the renminbi would reduce the 
capacity of these companies to service their debts in foreign currency, in an environment 
where the corporate sector’s total indebtedness is very high. 
In order to assess the intensity and persistence of the pressures on the renminbi exchange 
rate, it is important to know whether the renminbi is under- or overvalued in fundamental 
terms. Although China has a substantial current account surplus (above 2% of GDP), 
several indicators suggest that there has been a reversal of the historic undervaluation of 
the renminbi in recent years.14 Since 2005, the renminbi exchange rate has appreciated by 
60% in real effective terms (see Chart  2). The currency’s recent depreciation has only 
partially offset the appreciation since 2014 (20% in real effective terms).
Another way of solving the trilemma would be to reverse some of the external financial 
liberalisation measures adopted in recent years. This would enable China to recover 
some room for manoeuvre in its monetary and exchange rate policy in the short term. 
Selective capital controls or “capital flow management measures” could be implemented 
12  See International Monetary Fund (2015) and Prasad et al. (2005).
13  At the aggregate level, these financial stability considerations can be confined, as China holds international 
reserves four times the size of its external debt and part of the reduction in dollar indebtedness of these 
companies already took place in 2015, as analysed in Box 1.
14  See International Monetary Fund (2015).
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to eliminate the most speculative component of capital outflows. Indeed, some of the 
measures adopted recently – restrictions on the accumulation of short positions in Hong 
Kong’s offshore market in early 2016, the imposition of reserve ratios on offshore renminbi 
deposits held by Chinese residents, certain restrictions on card payments abroad, and 
limits on insurance policies arranged in Hong Kong by Chinese residents15 – can be 
interpreted in this sense.
However, it is unlikely that China will turn its back on the essential aspects of external 
financial liberalisation, due to the high cost this would have at both the international and 
domestic level. Internationally, it would compromise the status of the renminbi as a reserve 
currency;16 according to the review conducted by the IMF in late 2015 for its inclusion in 
the SDR basket, the renminbi qualified as a “freely usable currency”. Domestically, a 
reversal of liberalisation would run counter to rebalancing the growth model sought by the 
authorities. Indeed, financial repression and maintaining a low return on savings are among 
the factors that have contributed most to an inefficient allocation of resources in China, 
with excessively high investment rates in low profitability sectors. External financial 
openness enhances potential external diversification, reducing the risk of the formation of 
bubbles in China.17
Finally, a third possibility in respect of the trilemma is that the Chinese authorities could 
continue to opt for a framework of exchange rate stability to encourage development and 
macroeconomic stability. In this case, if the process of liberalising the capital account is 
not reversed and capital outflows continue, the trilemma would be solved by means of 
foreign exchange intervention (selling reserves to support the exchange rate) and, 
ultimately, by raising interest rates, which seems unlikely in the current situation. The Asian 
crisis of 1997 showed that this kind of strategy does not work in situations of cyclical 
weakness and it is unlikely that China will adopt it. Although China’s starting position is 
sound, as it has abundant international reserves, a current account surplus and low 
inflation, in the medium term the risk of accumulating imbalances with a fixed exchange 
rate would only postpone the adjustment.
The three alternatives considered offer a reference framework for assessing the trade-offs 
that the Chinese authorities face. Nevertheless, during the transition towards a more open 
capital account and greater exchange rate flexibility, the Chinese authorities, in view of the 
potential risks that each alternative entails, seem to have opted for intermediate solutions: 
increasing exchange rate flexibility gradually, but without permitting a sharp depreciation 
of the exchange rate; intervening in the foreign exchange market while trying not to impair 
reserves excessively, and advancing towards a controlled openness of the capital account. 
In early 2016 the Chinese authorities again used credit expansion again,18 together with a 
more expansive monetary policy, to support short-term growth and thus stabilise the 
exchange rate, which could adversely affect the rebalancing of the economy. 
15  And possible “moral suasion” measures, such as enquiries to banks on the possible fractioning of dollar 
purchases by customers to sidestep individual capital controls.
16  The criteria used to include a currency in the SDR basket are, broadly, that the country be a major exporter of 
goods and services (gateway criterion), and that its currency be freely usable. The latter concept – coined by 
the IMF in 1977 and applied for the first time in 2000 – is ambiguous and susceptible to differing interpretations 
by the Board. A currency is freely usable when: 1) it is widely used to make payments in international trade and 
financial transactions; and 2)  it is widely traded in the major currency markets. Free use, however, does not 
imply full convertibility or having a floating exchange rate regime. 
17  See Prasad (2016) and Prasad (2009) for a detailed review of the reasons why financial liberalisation should be 
a priority for China.
18  See García Herrero (2015).
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Against this background, uncertainties regarding the priority assigned to the various 
objectives and their timing might lead to bouts of greater volatility on the financial markets, 
which assign changing probabilities to the risks of depreciation, imposition of capital controls 
and errors in policy design, or a combination of all of these. Also, the international 
environment may be a key determinant for the Chinese strategy: a speedy normalisation of 
monetary conditions in the United States – which does not currently appear to be the most 
likely scenario – or a substantial appreciation of the dollar would strain the situation in China 
even more, as could more intense quantitative easing in the euro area or in Japan, which 
would trigger the depreciation of their currencies. Conversely, the stabilisation of growth in 
China or a decrease in capital outflows could lead to conditions better suited to advancing 
towards greater exchange rate flexibility and greater monetary policy independence.
China’s financial liberalisation has advanced very significantly in recent years, both 
internally and externally. Internally, interest rates on loans and deposits have finally been 
fully liberalised and a bank deposit guarantee fund has been set up, both being crucial to 
reducing the aggregate savings rate and enabling the financial sector to more efficiently 
allocate credit among different investment opportunities. Externally, the Shanghai and 
Hong Kong stock market connection was established, which has significantly broadened 
investment limits for investors not resident in China, and some of the more significant 
capital controls on capital inflows, particularly regarding the access of institutional 
investors to Chinese foreign exchange and renminbi bond markets, have been removed. 
Although there are still numerous de jure restrictions on capital outflows, capital controls 
are becoming increasingly porous. Against this background, there have been several bouts 
of turbulence in the financial markets, which have recently prompted the authorities to 
tighten some of these controls. Additionally, the exchange rate regime has been made 
more flexible by shifting from a de facto managed float against the dollar to a float that also 
takes into account a basket of currencies. 
The liberalisation process is taking place in a complex international and domestic 
environment. On the one hand, the deceleration of the Chinese economy and the expectations 
of depreciation of the renminbi associated therewith have caused unprecedented capital 
outflows, complicating the transition towards greater exchange rate flexibility that would 
have been easier to manage in a context of currency appreciation. On the other, it is precisely 
now, at the beginning of a cycle of rising interest rates in the United States, that China needs 
to retain greater headroom for monetary policy in order to adapt it to its domestic conditions 
and dissociate its currency from a potential appreciation of the dollar. Finally, the overriding 
objective is to obtain international financial recognition more in line with China’s actual 
weight in global trade and in the global economy. China has pursued this objective through 
a liberalisation of the financial account that has been faster than was expected a few years 
ago, enabling the renminbi to become part of the IMF’s SDR in 2016, thus achieving initial 
acceptance as a reserve currency. Financial liberalisation will help to rebalance China’s 
economy and to bring about sustainable growth in the medium term, helping to maintain its 
contribution to world growth. However, any liberalisation process entails risks and, 
accordingly, new bouts of instability, like those of 2015, cannot be ruled out.
17/5/2016.
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BOX 1 INDICATORS OF COMPLIANCE WITH SDR BASKET ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA1 
Trade criterion
In terms of five-year averages (2010-2014), China is the world’s 
third largest exporter of goods and services (with a weight of 
10.5% in global exports) after the euro area (18.3%) and the 
United States (13.6%), and well ahead of the other two countries 
included in the SDR basket (Japan and the United Kingdom, with 
weights of 5% and 4.8%, respectively).
Freely usable currency criterion
Widely used:
— Weight in official reserves: since the RMB is not one of the seven 
currencies identified in the COFER, the IMF proposes observing 
the holdings in Official Foreign Currency Assets, which would 
make the RMB the seventh most widely used currency, with a 
weight of 1.1% in the total, behind the four SDR currencies and 
the Australian and Canadian dollars.
— Weight in international banking liabilities: estimates point to 
1.8% in 2015 Q2, positioning the RMB as the fifth most widely 
used currency after the SDR currencies and slightly ahead of the 
Swiss franc.
— Weight in the stock of international fixed-income instruments: 
the RMB has moved from a virtually non-existent weight in 
2010, when it ranked 21st, to 0.4% in 2015 Q2, ranking ninth 
among the most widely used currencies, behind the four SDR 
currencies, the Swiss franc, the Australian dollar, the Canadian 
dollar and the Swedish krona. However, in terms of issuance of 
international debt securities, the RMB would be the sixth most 
widely used currency, with a weight of 1% (as compared with 
22nd position in 2010).
— International payments through SWIFT: the RMB has become 
the eighth most widely used currency in international payments 
through the SWIFT payment system, after the four SDR 
currencies, the Swiss franc, the Canadian dollar and the 
Australian dollar. The RMB is the third most widely used currency 
for documentary credit transactions, with a modest weight of 
2%, after the euro (7.1%) and the US dollar (86%).
Widely traded:
— Trading volume in foreign exchange markets: the weight of the 
RMB grew from 0.4% in 2010 (ranking 17th) to 1.1% at end-2013 
(ranking 9th) and is expected to be much higher in 2015. RMB 
trading volumes are very high in Asia, low (although increasing) 
in Europe and still very low in North America.
1  Prepared by Xavier Serra and Irina Balteanu. Based on the new weighting 
formula, the weight of the renminbi in the SDR will be the third largest 
(10.92%) after the US dollar (41.73%) and the euro (30.93%) and ahead 
of the Japanese yen (8.33%) and pound sterling (8.09%), effective 
1 October 2016.
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BOX 2 CAPITAL OUTFLOWS FROM CHINA                                                                                       
Capital outflows from China have been a major cause for concern 
over the past year. Outflows began in mid-2014 when there were 
generalised expectations of renminbi depreciation due to the 
uncertainty over the scale of China’s economic slowdown. In 
2015 H2 these two events intensified against the background of 
the stock market crisis and the uncertainty caused by the two 
changes to the renminbi exchange rate regime in August and 
December. To analyse these movements, this box draws on the 
financial account of the balance of payments, available up to 
2015 Q4.
The data for 2015 H2 show that China’s financial account became 
strongly negative (more than $300  billion; see Chart  1). Capital 
outflows were concentrated in the “Other Investment” item 
associated with changes in bank loans and deposits and trade 
credit. However, analysis of the breakdown of the financial 
account, and of net and gross flows, provides a more qualified 
valuation.
Firstly, the net balance of foreign direct investment in China has 
eased substantially in recent years. With respect to gross flows, 
this moderation is due to a greater extent to an increase in China’s 
investment abroad, since higher inflows of FDI into China continue 
to be observed. The substantial increase in China’s direct 
investment abroad reflects an increasing participation of Chinese 
investors in the global economy, including the Government’s 
development projects abroad, such as the New Silk Road project. 
This positive trend is also reflected under “other investment”, 
where assets include bank loans used to finance a fair amount of 
China’s diversification outside its borders.
Chart 1
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SOURCE: CEIC database.
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OTHER INVESTMENT AND PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT
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BOX 2 CAPITAL OUTFLOWS FROM CHINA (cont’d)
Secondly, strong movements are identified under “other investment”, 
possibly linked to the expectations of renminbi depreciation, which 
give rise to sizable material net outflows from China. These 
movements affect both assets and liabilities. On the one hand, 
resident investors have changed their preferences from holding 
assets in renminbi and debt in foreign currencies in order to benefit 
from the appreciation of the Chinese currency until mid-2014 to the 
opposite position, especially in 2015 H2. The prospect of depreciation 
explains repayment of debt in dollars and a decline in trade credit, 
and the increase in foreign currency assets, which has caused 
resident investors to convert into dollars (mainly US and Hong Kong 
dollars) a large share of their renminbi deposits held in Hong Kong. 
On the other, non-resident investors have also reduced their renminbi 
deposits in China and Hong Kong (see Chart 2).
The stock market crisis also had a significant impact in terms of 
non-residents’ portfolio outflows, although its effect on the 
financial account is relatively limited, since portfolio investment is 
much lower than “other investment”.
In light of these data, it appears that in 2015 H2 capital outflows 
were driven primarily by the unwinding of positions held owing to 
expectations of appreciation of the renminbi, while investment 
abroad, associated with China’s growing role in the global 
economy, continued to increase. In addition, there is scant 
evidence of a flight of foreign investment or of capital outflows 
from households and firms, which would have been reflected in a 
fall in direct investment in China and in a decrease in bank deposits 
in the national financial system.
